http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/9454 Thought
Control
This breed is being rapidly cloned and
it's adding a toxic element to important national policy debates. It's also
changing the fundamental nature of the way think tanks operate. It used to be that think tanks were funded
to do independent basic research that upheld the organizations' missions but
wasn't targeted at creating a specific effect. Increasingly, though, think
tanks are being funded to do applied research aimed at created what's called
an "advocacy impact," seducing legislators and administration
officials to adopt their policy proposals or to heed their counsel on
important policy questions. If that sounds like lobbying to you, you
should know that it does to a lot of people who are a part of the think tank
world and are concerned about these changes. Judis includes a story about the earlier days at the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI) that provides a refreshing glimpse of a time when
think tanks used to be less for sale. He notes how, in the early 1970s, AEI's
leadership worried about attracting IRS wrath if its policy reports appeared
to influence Congressional votes. So they did what they could to make it seem
as if they were staying away from legislative arm-twisting. For instance,
then-AEI President William Baroody delayed the
release of a study supporting a Nixon administration supersonic transport aircraft
program until two days after the Senate had voted on it. Some of AEI's
friends, though, thought their fear of creating an advocacy impact was
foolish, a kind of self-inflicted irrelevance. That's, in part, what gave Paul Weyrich and Edward Feulner the
impetus to launch the Heritage Foundation, which they said would have more
"quick response capability." Such capability was very attractive to
all kinds of funders who wanted their money to
create action, not academic conversation. Today, Heritage is the most
influential think tank in the country. And there are many Heritage wannabes
scattered all over the political spectrum. They thrive to the degree that
they connect big financial support with work that leads to measurable
legislative and policy results. The problems with this model are
multitudinous. When policy analysis is compromised, so is the quality of the
national debate. And when those seeking to influence policy turn to think
tanks to get hard results, it becomes increasingly difficult for think tanks
to raise money that isn't results oriented. So, think tanks act more like
lobbying firms. But the rules for lobbyists and think
tanks are different—lobbyists are regulated and compelled to be transparent,
and think tanks are only minimally so. Lobbying laws mandate—among many other
activities—the disclosure of meals purchased, trips sponsored, and gifts
provided to government officials, and a number of ethics-monitoring centers are in place to enforce the regulations. Virtually none of these requirements are
applied to think tanks. Yet, think tanks are seen as such important vehicles
for advocacy that a popular Georgetown University course on lobbying lists
them as the second item in a roster called the "Lobbyist's Tool
Kit." And some of the nation's leading publications, including The
Washington Post, National Journal and Roll Call, have
sections in their paper entirely dedicated to the industry. The framers of the U. S. Constitution did
not provide for lobbyists in their theories of government. Lobbying, broadly
defined, can refer to anyone or any group attempting to influence policy.
Over time, the term lobbyist has come to mean a paid agent of influence, an
advocacy agent—often a lawyer, public relations representative, or former
government official—whose knowledge of the back corridors of government can
provide an edge in influencing political decisions.
Most think tanks are organized in American
corporate law under the same umbrella as charities and educational
organizations—what are called 501(c)3 organizations.
As such, think tanks can't devote more than a trivial 5 percent of their
total resources to lobbying and political advocacy. But the line is fuzzy. If DaimlerChrysler,
for instance, wanted to educate a group of Congressional staffers or members
about the ways in which Korea was failing to live up to the terms of a
bilateral auto agreement, or if the Biotechnology Industry Association wanted
to lay out the reasons why Europe's "precautionary principle"
regarding genetically modified products was a violation of science, free
trade and modernity itself, then these interests might try to get an
organization to help them make their points. So they might call my employer
(the New America Foundation) or the Heritage Foundation, the Brookings
Institution, the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, the Cato Institute, the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace or the American Enterprise Institute to host a luncheon
or a conference to provide "education" for public officials about
these issues. These special interests could also ask a non-profit entity to
organize a fancy trip to study biotech issues in One reason why think tanks are so
attractive to moneyed political players is that the intellectuals who work
for them seem more legitimate than corporate spokespeople or lobbyists. So
part of what's being bought is credibility. Also attractive is that the contributions
are tax-deductible. In other words, a group of wealthy individuals worried
about the negative impact on their businesses of trade with China could
either give money to members of Congress and political parties—which is not
tax deductible—or they could make major, unlimited contributions to various
think tanks to host Congressional staff for dinners, conferences and trips. Not only are the contributions
tax-deductible, they don't have to be disclosed. It's that quiet, undisclosed
advocacy that has given rise to a term for all of this: "deep
lobbying." Deep lobbying is helping the think-tank sector thrive, while
enlightened policy decisions wither in the well-worn grooves of a paralyzed debate. For think tanks to grow in this climate
they often struggle with a Faustian bargain—taking money from donors and,
while maintaining the guise of policy objectivity and seriousness, doing the
bidding of lobbyists. The lack of IRS resources to investigate
the non-profit sector in any serious way, combined with the inherent
fuzziness in differentiating between "public education"
and lobbying, must be addressed. Yes, think tanks could voluntarily commit to
more ethical governance and improved transparency. But, inevitably, not all
organizations will play along. So the IRS will ultimately have to get
involved. It could begin by looking into non-profit institutions that fail to
deliver credible services to the public and that tend to act more as
tax-sheltered income machines for key principals in the organization. Money will always be part of the
think-tank business. But when that money and the interests behind it lurk in
the shadows of the policy debate, the nation's interests are put at risk. And it's a
risk we can no longer afford to take. |